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Comment  Chris Riddell
Stock options and, in particular, equity awards broadly deﬁ  ned, remain 
an area with many unanswered questions. Why do companies use stock 
options (or other equity awards)? do they motivate employees; lead to 
greater retention? What value do employees place on equity awards? We still 
know relatively little about these fundamental questions. Further, in light 
of recent changes in accounting practices for stock options where ﬁ  rms are 
now required to recognize compensation expense at the time of the grant, 
as well as international generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
standards likely coming to the United States, there are many policy issues 
still to be addressed such as what types of option pricing models may or 
should be mandated in the future.
A key reason why our knowledge is so limited in the area of equity com-
pensation is data availability: to think deeply about issues such as those in the 
preceding, we require detailed information on the contractual parameters of 
a stock grant coupled with personnel records for a reasonable time period 
(e.g., long enough to examine such behavior as turnover or exercising and 
so forth). Locating such data is, unfortunately, far from straightforward! 
Hallock and Olson have done an admirable job in ﬁ  nding several sources 
of such data resulting in a series of exciting papers (also see Hallock and 
Olson 2007a,b).
In this chapter, the authors focus primarily on how employees value stock 
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options. In a separate section, they also provide a useful discussion on the 
wide variety of data sources that have been used for analyzing equity com-
pensation, including the pros and cons of each. The latter will be a nice 
resource for researchers interested in the ﬁ  eld. In my comment, I focus on 
the following: using data on employee exercising to learn about stock option 
valuation.
The main part of the chapter uses ten years of data from several stock 
grants made by a company to its middle managers as part of a stock pur-
chase plan. This data contains the complete exercising history from this set 
of grants and all key contractual parameters. This is the exact sort of data 
that, while diﬃcult, risky (because these attempts often do not pan out), 
and time consuming to compile, can lead to important insights into the role 
of compensation policy within the ﬁ  rm. The authors describe the Black- 
Scholes-  Merton (BSM) method for option pricing, which has traditionally 
been the main method for computing fair value for tradeable options and 
show how basic exercising behavior—in particular, early or suboptimal exer-
cising (i.e., exercising before the expiration date)—is inconsistent with BSM. 
Moreover, this ﬁ  nding comes from a sample of managers who remain with 
the company for the entire term of the grants. The authors then develop a 
framework for estimating the value of these options to employees. The key 
ﬁ  nding is that this group of middle managers valued their options at much 
less than the BSM value.
In keeping with the theme of the conference, and given that I only have 
a small set of comments on the empirical work, the main purpose of my 
comment is to bring some of the institutional framework up to speed with 
current practices in option pricing and, in particular, draw attention to how 
this type of data can be used to test other approaches to the valuation of 
stock options and other equity awards. On the latter point, it is useful to 
stress that (in addition to compensatory stock options) many other equity 
awards, including stock appreciation rights (SARs), performance-  vesting 
awards, and phantom stock have had to be expensed since 1993.1 The recent 
changes to the accounting of stock options, therefore, creates a level playing 
ﬁ  eld for equity awards. Many practitioners are predicting that this will lead 
to a decline in the use of stock options and an increase in the use of other 
equity- related vehicles, where often the ﬁ  rm can be much more creative, and 
incentive-  oriented, in the contractual parameters.
How employees value stock options is very important because for 
accounting purposes—including budget planning for ﬁ  rms because they 
have to issue (or buy back) new shares—we want to know what amount 
they have been compensated (just as with cash compensation). If, as most 
studies including this one have found, employees value stock options at sub-
stantially less than BSM, then stock options may be a rather expensive way 
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to compensate employees. Moreover, understanding how employees value 
stock options will surely help understand their eﬀectiveness from a com-
pensation policy standpoint. However, the analysis in the chapter should be 
framed within a more up-  to-  date institutional framework. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
chapter is framed solely within the context of BSM for computing fair value 
for equity awards. The BSM method is a simple, static, six-  variable formula 
that is literally calculated by a single cell-  Excel formula (in practice). It is 
referred to as closed-  form given that the input variables are ﬁ  xed assump-
tions and, therefore, cannot change over time or interact with other variables 
(such as exercising behavior). Most other papers in this literature, from the 
ones I am familiar with, do this as well because BSM has been, by far, the 
main method for the valuation of tradeable stock options.
While it may be true that BSM is still regarded as the workhorse val-
uation method, this appears to be changing. The 2004 revised Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) exposure draft Share-  based Pay-
ments (FAS 123R), which led to the new requirement that noncompensa-
tory stock options are expensed to the income statement at the time of the 
grant using a fair-  value method, says a great deal more about models for 
valuing stock options.2 To be brief, FAS 123R notes: “a lattice model is 
more fully able to capture and better reﬂ  ects the characteristics of a par-
ticular ESO . . . is preferable and should be used if it is practical to do so.” 
Lattice models (i.e., binomials, trinomials) are, thus, now considered the 
preferred technique. Most practitioners believe lattice models (or other pre-
ferred numerical methods, such as Monte Carlo simulation) were denoted as 
preferred rather than mandated because the latter methodologies were—at 
that time—not readily available commercially and because companies may 
not have had the necessary data on input variables not required under BSM 
such as exercising behavior. I will say more on this in the following. But even 
a crude look through the major consulting ﬁ  rms that work in this area, as 
well as the many software packages that have emerged in the last few years, 
reveals that the BSM approach is quite likely on the way out.3 Also, in prac-
tice, the “preferred” designation means that once ﬁ  rms switch, they will be 
essentially unable to go back. Given the current state of the practice on 
equity compensation valuation, it would have been a useful addition for the 
authors to show how their total cost calculations diﬀer when the preferred 
valuation models are applied to the data. Moreover, this would distinguish 
the chapter from the others in the literature where multiple authors have 
2. Compensatory stock options actually had to be expensed before FAS 123R, but—based 
on what practitioners have written in many articles in the practitioner journals—most ﬁ  rms 
avoided expensing options by making them noncompensatory with a strike price equal to the 
current market price (despite it being quite clear, even in job ads, that they were a form of 
compensation).
3. The more advanced methodologies are now very approachable with several plug- and- play 
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developed a new framework and found that employees value options at less 
than BSM.4
Hallock and Olson provide a very nice summary of the assumptions 
inherent to BSM, but a couple of additional points can be made, although 
it should be stressed that not all of the following issues necessarily hold to the 
speciﬁ  c case examined in the chapter. There are several reasons why employ-
ees may have undiversiﬁ  ed portfolios that make employee stock options 
valuation inconsistent with standard ﬁ  nancial theory. Clearly a key feature 
is that a stock option cannot be sold, but other possibilities are contractual 
requirements that the individual must have large holdings of the company’s 
stock (more common for executives, however) or that such holdings are 
encouraged. As well, other contractual parameters such as vesting condi-
tions (both time-  based and performance-  based), forfeiture of unvested or 
out-  of-  the-  money options when an employee leaves, and blackout periods 
can also make stock option valuation more complex than standard option 
valuation. FAS 123R solidiﬁ  es the use of more advanced methods in its 
recommendation on using lattice (and several other) models by noting that 
such approaches: (a) allows for changes in the traditional six variables over 
the contractual term, and (b) allows for estimates of early exercising pat-
terns and postvesting termination over the term (thereby providing a more 
accurate adjustment for nontransferability). Overall, exercising behavior, in 
particular, is likely to be key in advancing this literature.
Hallock and Olson note that rigorously modeling turnover and exercising 
is a diﬃcult step. Indeed, the expectation for employers appears to be that 
data on previous grants is used to simply calculate some average values for 
these variables. But, with this data, the authors can test not only BSM, as 
they have currently done, but also the preferred methods and, in particular, 
draw a more transparent link between their approach (which, of course, 
builds oﬀ of exercising behavior) and other available methods including 
those in the academic literature. We know, as far I can tell, very little about 
the interactions between market conditions, exercising behavior, and exiting 
the ﬁ  rm, but such decisions made by employees are going to be important 
for future option- pricing models. Moreover, a rigorous analysis of exercising 
and exit rates from the ﬁ  rm will have stronger implications for compensa-
tion policy as a behavioral lever, particularly given the prediction that FAS 
123R may lead to an increased use of other equity vehicles, such as SARs 
and performance-  vesting awards, where ﬁ  rms can be more creative in the 
terms of the contract.
There are two empirical issues in the chapter worth considering, particu-
larly given the important policy and practitioner implications of the chapter. 
4. Other related papers not discussed that interested readers can look at include Bettis, Bizjak, 
and Lemmon (2003), Detemple and Sundaresan (1999), and Ingersoll (2006). Interestingly, 
Hodder and Jackwerth (2005) ﬁ  nd that managers who have control over the risk level in the 
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First, it is unclear that restricting the sample to individuals who stayed with 
the ﬁ  rm for the duration of the contractual term is reasonable. This certainly 
simpliﬁ  es the analysis and yields a strong test of heterogeneity in exercis-
ing behavior (because we know everyone stayed until the expiration date). 
But, if the model is to be taken seriously as a way employees value options, 
we need to, among other things, account for employees exercising “early” 
as a joint decision with leaving the ﬁ  rm.5 Further, even if the model is not 
meant to be an option-  pricing methodology itself but rather an approach 
for testing key assumptions of valuation methods, we simply lose too much 
information about employee behavior that is common in practice and often 
noted as central to the limitations of BSM valuation. Second, and related 
to the preceding point, the empirical strategy relies on there being multiple 
grants so that we have multiple exercising decisions (across grants) for a 
given employee. This is a clever approach from an econometric standpoint 
but is problematic from an option-  pricing standpoint because ﬁ  rms have to 
calculate fair value for a single grant.
Hallock and Olson have provided a nice review piece on current issues 
in stock options, including a thorough review of the various data sources 
available to researchers; a detailed summary of the Black-  Scholes-  Merton 
method for valuing options; and, most important, a summary of some of 
their evidence on exercising behavior using a detailed case study of a ﬁ  rm 
and the implications of these results for how we value stock options. The 
latter is exactly the kind of rigorous empirical work with detailed data and 
contractual information from a ﬁ  rm that we need to move the compensation 
literature forward.
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